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ABSTRACT 
We study the impact of the suspension of opening and closing call auctions by the National Stock 
Exchange of India in 1999.  We compare volatility, efficiency and liquidity (VEL) of securities before 
and after suspension, and estimate the value of the auctions using an event study.  Following 
suspension, VEL improved and the CARs were significant but not uniformly positive or negative.  
Also, less liquid stocks traded less in the auctions than other securities, especially at the opening, and 
they experienced gains following suspension.  This is consistent with there being liquidity externalities 
associated with auctions, as appears to be the case in some industrial countries.  We conclude that 
opening and closing call auctions may not necessarily improve share trading in a less liquid emerging 
market. 
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1.  Introduction 
Two of the most important topics in market microstructure are the design of trading protocols and the 
evaluation of their effectiveness.  Since trading protocols provide the framework within which markets 
operate they play a central role in price formation and discovery (Madhavan, 2000).  Evaluating the 
effectiveness of different protocols is therefore a key concern for market authorities and regulators.  
One of the most hotly debated issues in this area is the effectiveness of call auctions as compared to 
continuous trading systems or to hybrid protocols featuring both systems.  In theory, call auctions 
provide an efficient mechanism for aggregating diverse information because trading does not take 
place until price discovery has occurred (Economides and Schwartz, 1995), whereas under continuous 
trading, price discovery and trading take place simultaneously implying that trades may occur at 
“false” prices (Schwartz, 2000).  However, continuous trading involves greater immediacy and 
therefore less price risk than an auction.  Since there is a delay in establishing the trading price during 
an auction, the “true” price may change between the submission and execution of an order (Madhavan, 
1992).  Therefore, Economides and Schwartz (1995) argue for a hybrid system: an opening call 
auction to aggregate overnight information efficiently, followed by continuous trading during the day.  
Some of the major industrial stock exchanges have introduced an auction to open and in some cases 
also to close the day’s trading (Ellul, Shin and Tonks, 2004). 
Thus far, the empirical evidence on the effectiveness of auctions is inconclusive, with some studies 
identifying gains from the auction process but others finding that continuous trading is superior.  We 
review this research in section 2.  There are several possible reasons for this mixed evidence.  First, 
call auctions vary in structure and different call auction structures may have different effects1.  Second, 
different markets have different trading protocols, including listing requirements, price limits, and 
minimum tick sizes, and similarly-structured auctions may have different effects in a different market 
context (Kairys, Kruza and Kumpins, 2000b).  Third, comparisons between call auctions and 
continuous trading will be difficult because the two systems being compared rarely share a common 
set of trading protocols (Madhavan, 2000).  For example, much of the evidence on the effectiveness of 
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 2 
call auctions is gleaned from markets where auctions are used to begin or end trading, but Amihud, 
Mendelson and Murgia (1990) show that, in Milan, there was little to choose in terms of efficiency as 
between continuous trading and call auctions which were not held at the beginning of the day.  Other 
studies look at the impact of the replacement of call auctions by continuous trading (Amihud, 
Mendelson and Lauterbach, 1997), but such changes typically involve other reforms to the trading 
system making it difficult to conclude if costs or benefits are due to the switch to continuous trading or 
to other factors.  
A further important limitation of the existing empirical literature on call auctions is that it is mostly 
concerned with the stock markets of the major industrial countries.  Exceptionally, Shastri, Shastri and 
Sirodom (1995) investigated the impact of the opening call auction on the Bangkok stock exchange, 
and found that prices at the opening call were more volatile than during the rest of the day.  This could 
be because uncertainty and therefore volatility are at their maximum early in the day following the 
overnight closing rather than because of deficiencies in the call auction system per se, and this is 
supported by the results of Amihud et. al. (1990).  In general though, there has been very little 
research on stock exchanges in emerging markets.  This is an important omission because most 
emerging stock markets are less liquid than the major industrial countries, and it has been argued that 
call auctions are particularly suited for trading less liquid stocks (Madhavan, 1992).  This suggests that 
in emerging markets call auctions may have advantages over continuous trading systems in fostering 
the efficient trading of relatively illiquid securities.  However, this argument also underlines a further 
difficulty in comparing call auctions and continuous trading: if the effectiveness of an auction depends 
on the liquidity of the market, a proper comparison must control for differences in stock liquidity, and 
possibly other factors. 
In this paper we adopt a novel approach to the call-auction/continuous-trading debate.  We investigate 
the impact of the suspension of opening and closing call auctions by the National Stock Exchange of 
India (NSE) on the 9th June 19992.  As far as we are aware, this is the first study of the impact of a 
suspension of a trading protocol.  The NSE utilised an opening and closing call auction for some time 
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before the suspension, and an important aspect of the suspension is that other market protocols and 
arrangements remained unchanged.  Furthermore, since the continuous trading session took place both 
before and after the suspension, it is unlikely that the auctions would have limited the degree of 
immediacy in the market3.  We are therefore studying two systems with otherwise identical trading 
protocols; and this makes for a relatively clean comparison.  The NSE is an emerging market and 
includes a significant proportion of less liquid securities.  This enables us to investigate differences in 
the effect of the auction suspension as between more and less liquid securities in the market4.  Finally, 
there is growing practitioner interest in Indian markets and so far, relatively little research on India. 
Our paper has two main objectives.  First, we estimate the impact of the suspension of call auctions at 
the NSE, using the standard procedure of comparing the volatility, efficiency and liquidity (VEL) of 
traded securities in the market before and after suspension (Amihud, et. al., 1997).  Second, we 
estimate the value of the call auctions to traders using an event study to calculate the cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) for the sample securities.  If the auctions improved the price discovery 
process, we would expect to observe a deterioration in VEL following suspension: increased volatility, 
a reduction in open and close price efficiency and lower liquidity.  The suspension of the auctions 
would be value-decreasing, and we would expect to find negative CARs.  This would be in line with 
the findings of Pagano and Schwartz (2003) that the introduction of a closing call auction at the Paris 
Bourse created improvements in the price discovery process.  If on the other hand, the auctions led to 
reduced immediacy and increased price risk then we would expect to observe an improvement in VEL 
following suspension, together with increased value and positive CARs.  Ellul, Shin and Tonks (2004) 
argue that the value of call auctions may be limited by “thick market externalities” by which traders 
only enter the auction if they believe a sufficient number of other traders will be present so as to 
establish informationally-efficient prices.   
Our tests suggest that average VEL broadly improved after the suspension of the auctions, but the 
mean CARs were generally negative.  Therefore, we conducted further tests to examine the 
relationships between the responses to the auction suspension and the characteristics of the sample 
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securities.  It turns out that stock liquidity is an important factor in explaining the results which we 
obtain: less liquid stocks gained less from the auction than did more liquid stocks.  This finding is 
consistent with the arguments of Ellul, Shin and Tonks (2004), and suggests that it cannot be assumed 
that call auctions will necessarily be of particular benefit in a less liquid emerging market. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  In section 2 we review relevant theoretical and 
empirical literature on call auctions and continuous trading.  Section 3 sets out some background 
material on the NSE and describes the data used in this study.  In section 4, we investigate the impact 
of the suspension of call auctions on VEL.  The event study is discussed in section 5 and the 
relationships among the estimated CARs and changes in VEL are explored.  A concluding discussion 
and evaluation is given in section 6. 
2.  Research Background 
The central issue in the debate between call auctions and continuous trading is the trade-off between 
information efficiency and immediacy.  Periodic call auctions aggregate information more efficiently, 
but they lack continuity and therefore reduce the immediacy of trading.  However, these arguments are 
less relevant where call auctions are used at the opening or closing, since trading occurs continuously 
for the rest of the day.  Moreover, lack of immediacy is an issue in any setting in which trades are 
clustered in a short period, and this may occur independently of an auction (Admati and Pfeliderer, 
1988). 
These considerations suggest that an opening call auction could improve pricing efficiency with little 
loss of immediacy as compared with continuous trading.  Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1999) identified a 
clear price discovery process in the opening call auction of the (former) Paris Bourse: orders posted 
later in the call contained increasing amounts of information about the true price, while those posted 
early could be classified as noise.  Davies (2003) found that most of the orders in the pre-opening 
period of the Toronto Stock Exchange were submitted with the intention of trading5.  Amihud and 
Mendelson (1987) compared the opening call auction with the continuous trading session on the 
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NYSE, and found that opening returns exhibited greater dispersion, higher negative autocorrelation 
and a larger residual error component than closing returns.  Shastri, Shastri and Sirodom (1995) found 
that opening prices on the Thailand Stock Exchange, which are set by a call auction, tended to be more 
volatile than those of the rest of the day.  However, since uncertainty is typically at its peak at the 
opening of a session, these results may just reflect the initial uncertainty, and not some inefficiency in 
the auction process itself.  This point is supported by the results of Amihud, et. al. (1990) and Amihud 
and Mendelson (1991), who analysed call auctions which were not held at the start of the trading day 
and found that the auctions were no less efficient than continuous trading. 
A more subtle argument is that participants in an auction may use the setup to conceal information 
from other traders.  In the model of Caillaud and Mezzetti (2004) some participants give up profitable 
trading opportunities in an initial auction, in the hope that the resulting price movements generate 
higher subsequent profits.  The experimental finding of Biais and Pouget (2000) suggest that there 
should be a pre-opening period prior to the auction, where a volume maximising price is announced on 
the basis of the incoming orders, but no trades are executed.  This information augments price 
discovery in the opening call auction and continuous trading that follow. 
Comerton-Forde and Rydge (2006) considered two empirical cases of manipulative orders: the first 
one for a liquid stock and the second one for an illiquid stock.  They studied how auctions featuring 
different matching algorithms perform in dealing with market manipulation.  The authors showed that 
manipulative orders can impact on the prices established in the auction and manipulation is less costly 
in illiquid stocks.  In the case of the illiquid stock, a price was established in the presence of a 
manipulative order – yet the auction did not establish a price in the absence of the manipulative order.  
This casts doubts on the notion that auctions are particularly suited to trade less liquid stocks.  This 
idea corroborates with the empirical findings of Madhavan and Panchapagesan (2000) who analysed 
the opening auction on NYSE.  The authors found that call auctions might not be the ideal trading 
setup for less liquid stocks, given that the latter are considerably sensitive to order imbalances which 
might result in mispricings.   
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The efficiency of call auctions also depends on the trading structure with which they are compared.  
Angel and Wu (2001) suggest that a dealer market may be better equipped than call auctions to handle 
the random nature of order imbalances, although they themselves advocate a hybrid trading 
mechanism incorporating features of call auctions and dealer markets.  Call auctions should increase 
liquidity and reduce trading costs by batching small transactions which might have otherwise been 
executed sequentially (Economides and Schwartz, 1995).  Ellul, Shin and Tonks (2004) found that 
small orders were cheaper to execute in the London Stock Exchange (LSE) call auctions, but larger 
orders were cheaper to execute in the contemporaneous off-exchange dealer market.  Similarly, Kehr, 
Krahnen and Theissen (2001) found that Frankfurt Stock Exchange auctions provided transaction cost 
savings over continuous trading for small transactions, but not for large transactions. 
The issue of whether call auctions constitute a better trading method for less liquid stocks has also 
been debated.  Less liquid stocks may be subject to a greater degree of asymmetric information (Barry 
and Brown, 1984), implying that call auctions are especially suitable for trading such stocks.  
Comerton-Forde (1999) compared trading on the Australian Stock Exchange which commences with a 
call auction, with that on the Jakarta Exchange which commences with continuous trading.  She 
concluded that the auction increased liquidity and reduced volatility in initial trading, particularly for 
less liquid stocks.  However, Ellul, Shin and Tonks (2004) found that on the LSE, where trading at the 
opening and the closing may take place either through call auctions or the dealer system, less liquid 
stocks tended to trade more frequently in the dealer market, even if the call auctions offered cost 
savings and greater pricing efficiency.  A possible explanation for this is that dealers guarantee the 
availability of a counterparty whereas call auctions depend to a higher degree on co-existing public 
orders.  This creates a “thick market externality”: traders will only enter an auction if they believe 
sufficient traders will be present so as to establish an informationally-efficient price.  This may be an 
important issue in less liquid emerging markets. 
Studies of changes in trading systems generally find that a switch from call auction to continuous 
trading increases stock values, for example in Paris (Muscarella and Piwowar, 2001), Tel Aviv 
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(Amihud, et. al.,1997) and Warsaw (Henke and Lauterbach, 2005).  However, Kalay, Wei and Wohl 
(2002) argued that these results may simply reflect investors’ preferences for stocks that trade 
continuously rather than stocks that trade at auction, although causation could also be two-way.  The 
changes in VEL of stocks in a switch from call auctions to continuous trading might also depend on 
the liquidity of different stocks.  Kairys, Kruza, and Kumpins (2000a) found that when the Riga Stock 
Exchange shifted from a call auction to a continuous trading system, overall liquidity increased, but 
the benefits accrued to stocks which were already liquid while the volumes of smaller company stocks 
declined. 
Ronen (1998) studied the impact of trading mechanisms on volatility by considering a change in the 
trading procedures on the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange.  The exchange used a call auction to end the 
trading day; yet in 1988 the mechanisms were reversed whereby the call auction was held prior to the 
continuous trading session.  The author reported no significant differences in opening volatility 
following the change, concluding that the trading mechanism does not affect the opening volatility. 
Aitken, Comerton-Forde and Frino (2002) analysed the introduction of a closing call auction on the 
Australian Stock Exchange, and noted that on high-volatility days, there is a pronounced tendency for 
traders to delay their trading till the auction.  They suggested that call auctions are more highly valued 
by traders on high-volaitlity days.  Despite this, one may question whether this effect might constitute 
a general tendency to postpone trading on high volatility days (in the hope that volatility reverts back 
to normal levels), irrespective of whether the session closes off with an auction or otherwise. 
3.  Data and Notation 
Our study is concerned with the National Stock Exchange of India (NSE) which was established in 
1994 and is one of two major Indian exchanges, along with the Bombay (Mumbai) Stock Exchange 
(BSE).  In 2000, around 1,300 equities were traded on NSE, through 960 brokerage firms (Shah and 
Sivakumar, 2000).  Most major stocks are quoted on both NSE and BSE which compete for listings 
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and order flow.  During the period covered by this paper there were around 400,000 transactions in a 
typical trading day on the NSE. 
The NSE began with continuous, screen-based, nationwide electronic trading.  Subsequently, the 
exchange introduced a pre-opening and post-closing call auction on an experimental basis.  These 
followed the rule that the price should maximise the total quantity traded, implying that net demand or 
supply should be zero.  Conditional orders such as “All-Or-None” were not considered in the auctions, 
but orders could be modified or cancelled during the sessions.  Market buy (sell) orders were 
considered as orders which were prepared to trade at the highest (lowest) available price; they 
obtained the best price priority and were listed at the top of the order book in the auction sessions.  For 
the rest of the trading day the system functioned as a continuous pure limit order book market, with 
time and price priorities applied to incoming orders.  The opening and closing auctions were 
suspended without prior notice on June 9th 1999.  The NSE did not subsequently reintroduce regular 
opening and closing auctions, although auctions may still be initiated by the exchange at any time for 
settlement-related reasons.  When regular auctions were in effect, the opening auction was held 
between 09:30 and 09:45, followed by continuous trading until 15:30, and subsequently by a closing 
auction between 15:30 and 15:45.  From June 9th 1999, continuous trading took place between 10:00 
and 15:30.  Our data period runs from March 2nd through September 4th 1999, or for 63 days either 
side of June 9th6. 
The NSE offers particular advantages for a study of this kind.  First, about 1,100 equities are traded 
enabling the selection of a large sample of stocks for analysis.  Second, trading volumes are high for 
the most liquid stocks, but there is a wide range of trading volumes, and this enables an analysis of the 
relationships between liquidity and trading protocols.  Third, there are no market-makers on the NSE, 
and therefore theories which suggest that market-makers are a factor in determining the relative 
efficiency of continuous trading versus call auctions will not affect the results of this study. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Table 1 about here 
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__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Data were extracted from the NSE historical trades data CDs7.  These include the volume and price of 
all trades on the exchange on a trade-by-trade basis.  In selecting the sample securities, we considered 
only the more liquid equity issues in order to obtain sufficient observations for analysis.  We selected 
170 stocks with the highest quantities traded, and a further 170 stocks with the highest Indian Rupee 
value traded.  We combined these samples, deleted 107 duplicated stocks and a further 51 stocks with 
missing observations or changes in equity structure (mergers, new share issues or stock splits), leaving 
a sample of 182 different stocks.  The sample includes a wide range of liquidity: we only excluded 
stocks in which there was no trading at all in at least one day of the sample.  We also utilised two 
different stock indices: the NSE Nifty, an index of the 50 most liquid stocks accounting for about 50% 
of NSE market capitalisation; and the BSE-500, an index of 500 shares quoted on the BSE8.  For the 
comparison analyses and the event study, the sampling interval was homogenised by the use of daily 
data on volumes and prices (the last trade price for each stock, unless otherwise specified).  Table 1 
shows the data periods used for these analyses. 
Subsequent to the suspension of the auctions it emerged that software problems may have caused the 
suspension9.  Therefore, before conducting the main analyses, we checked to see if the auction system 
was inherently defective by examining auction outcomes for evidence of contamination.  Clearly a 
contaminated auction would not provide a proper benchmark to evaluate auction performance vis-à-vis 
continuous trading.  We looked first at the Nifty returns distributions during the opening and closing in 
the ten trading days before suspension and the ten trading days afterwards.  If software problems were 
causing excessive price movements in the auction, we would expect to observe greater price 
dispersion during the auctions than without them.  To achieve a clean comparison, allowing for the 
generally higher volatility at the opening and closing, we compared the opening (or closing) 
distributions in the auctions with the opening (or closing) distributions on continous trading days 
(table 2).  It can be seen that the mean standard deviation (MSD) of the opening returns actually 
increased following suspension, indicating that it was unlikely that software problems in the opening 
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auction had caused unjustified price movements for a sustained period prior to suspension.  However, 
for the closing returns there is a significant decrease in the MSD suggesting the possibility of 
unjustified price movements in the closing auction. 
We would expect suspension to occur immediately following the identification of mispricing.  
Therefore, we also compared the standard deviation of the opening (or closing) distribution on the last 
auction date (June 8th) with the MSD for the rest of the May 26th to June 22nd sample.  The difference 
at the opening was again insignificant, suggesting that the June 8th opening auction functioned 
normally, but the standard deviation at the closing was significantly higher on June 8th than the MSD 
for the remaining days.  Furthermore, if the June 8th data is removed from the 10 day before-after 
comparison of the closings, the difference between the MSDs is no longer significant.  This suggests 
that there may have been software problems but that these were confined to the June 8th closing 
auction. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Tables 2, 3, 4 and Figure 1 about here 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
We checked this hypothesis directly by comparing the last closing auction (June 8th) with the closing 
calls of the preceding five trading days (table 3).  The duration of the last auction was more than twice 
that of the other days, and the average interval between observations was twice as long.  The change in 
the Nifty was much larger than in the other auctions, and the increase in the Nifty from 1162 to 1178 
was reversed next day, when it closed back at 1162.  Figure 1 shows that price movements in the final 
closing auction were also far more volatile than those in the preceding five auctions.  This tends to 
confirm our analysis that, if a software problem existed, its impact was confined to the last closing 
auction before suspension, and it did not affect the pricing process on other trading days.  We 
conclude that, if a software problem occurred, it was in the June 8th closing auction.  This would 
explain the unexpected suspension on the following day.   
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To get a more general idea of activity in the auctions before suspension, we selected three trading days 
at random from different days of the week and reasonably close to the suspension.  Summary statistics 
of trading activity on these days for high, medium and less liquid stocks are shown in table 4.  Trading 
frequencies increase with stock liquidity, and the level of activity is mostly higher for the closing 
auction than for the opening auction.  A possible explanation for this is that unexecuted orders at the 
end of the continuous session were automatically carried forward to the closing call, whereas 
outstanding orders at the end of the day were not necessarily carried forward to the subsequent day’s 
opening, since traders could cancel orders in anticipation of the overnight trading break. 
4.  The Impact of Auction Suspension on Volatility, Efficiency and Liquidity 
4.1  Volatility 
We assess the impact of suspension on market volatility by comparing the scaled intra-day price 
differences and overnight returns reversals, before and after the event.  We also test if auctions helped 
to reduce volatility associated with “high-news” days using a GARCH model. 
 The scaled intra-day price difference (SIDP) is an indicator of intra-day volatility given by: 
Di,t = (Phigh,i,t – Plow,i,t ) / Popen,i,t               (1) 
where Phigh,i,t, Plow,i,t and Popen,i,t are the highest, lowest and opening prices for security i on day t 
respectively.  We see from table 5 that mean intra-day volatility decreased significantly in the post-
event period, but there was no significant change in the standard deviations of Di,t. 
Overnight return reversals (ORR) are a measure of volatility between trading days.  If the auctions 
help in price discovery, we would expect lower overnight volatility during the period when auctions 
were held, and vice-versa.  A direct comparison between overnight returns in the pre-event and post-
event periods is potentially misleading as higher price changes in one period might be justified by the 
news in that period.  Thus we concentrate on the reversal of price movements.  If price movements 
overnight and during the subsequent day are driven independently by the news in each respective 
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period then we would expect there to be no systematic relation between overnight and next-day 
returns.  If however, overnight price movements are systematically reversed next day, this implies that 
the overnight movement was excessive and gives evidence of excess volatility.  To test for this we 
regress the daily return (ri,t)on the previous overnight return (rOi,t): 
titi
o
iiti rr ,,,                     (2) 
A significant negative πi gives evidence of price reversals and therefore of excess volatility. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Table 5 about here 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
The cross-company mean of the slope coefficients (π) is negative in both the pre-event and post-event 
period (table 5).  Furthermore, there was a significant increase in │π│ following suspension of the 
auctions implying an increase in volatility, in contrast to the results for SIDP.  We checked that there 
were no further events which might have impacted on volatility during this period by reviewing 
relevant NSE circulars.  On June 16th the National Securities Clearing Corporation applied additional 
volatility margins in respect of outstanding positions of trading members in highly volatile stocks.  
This might have discouraged members from increasing positions in volatile stocks and therefore might 
be expected to reduce volatility as between the pre-event and post-event period.  Furthermore only 
four of the affected stocks are included in our sample, indicating that the additional volatility margins 
were unlikely to have affected our results. 
A more general issue is that most Indian companies have their accounting year-end in March, and 
release their annual reports between March and June, in the pre-event window.  It could be argued that 
one might expect higher volatility in the pre-event window just because of the clustering of earnings 
reports.  However, Ball and Brown (1968) found that the impact of an earnings surprise on a 
company’s share price typically begins several months before the release of the annual report, and is 
almost fully impounded into the price by the time of the earnings announcement.  Furthermore, even 
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when there is a surprise in the announcement, the impact of the news on share prices and spreads is 
generally dissipated during the day of the announcement itself in as little as 15-30 minutes (Patell and 
Wolfson, 1984; Kim and Verrecchia, 1994).  This suggests that any effect of such announcements on 
pre-event window volatility would have been at most small, and confined to the SIDP measure10.  To 
verify this argument we checked the robustness of our findings using the results of Camilleri and 
Green (2005).  In that paper, we identified a monthly seasonal pattern of volatility in the NSE Nifty in 
which volatility does tend to be higher in March and April than in other months, perhaps due to the 
bunching of year-end reporting.  We used the volatility estimates from Camilleri and Green (2005) to 
adjust the SIDP statistics for these systematic seasonal volatility differences, and we then re-performed 
the SIDP comparisons.  The results (given in Appendix A) are very similar to those in table 5 and 
clearly show a very significant fall in SIDP following suspension.   
Even if auctions were not associated with a general reduction in volatility, it is still possible that they 
may have been useful on “high-news” days when greater volatility may be expected.  To investigate 
this we estimated EGARCH models of the Nifty11 before and after suspension.  If auctions helped 
dampen volatility on “high-news” days we would expect to see an increase in the effects of news on 
the conditional variance, post suspension.  In fact, the coefficients in the EGARCH model were mostly 
insignificant (table 5) and, if anything, there was a reduction in the effects of news post-suspension, 
both for “good news” shocks (α + γ) and for “bad news” shocks (α – γ).  On balance therefore, it 
seems clear that the auctions did not materially reduce market volatility. 
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4.2  Pricing Efficiency 
Relative Return Dispersion (RRD) is our first test of pricing efficiency. Following Amihud et. al. 
(1997), RRDt across the sampled securities during time t is defined as: 



n
i
itt n
RRD
1
21                     (3) 
In (3), εit are the residuals from the market model for security i at time t, and n is the number of 
sampled securities.  A lower RRDt indicates a lower pricing error and therefore greater efficiency.  The 
results in table 6 indicate that RRDt decreased very significantly suggesting that pricing became more 
efficient following suspension of the auctions. 
The autocorrelation of returns is our second measure of pricing inefficiency.  If prices adjust fully to 
new information, price changes should be uncorrelated provided that the flow of news is also 
uncorrelated, as we would expect.  We calculated first-order autocorrelation coefficients for each stock 
and most of the individual coefficients and the means were not significantly different from zero, 
suggesting that the sample stocks were efficiently priced in both periods (table 6).  There is a 
significant change in the autocorrelation coefficient as between the pre-event and post-event period, 
from predominantly negative to predominantly positive, suggesting that the nature of the price 
discovery process may have changed following suspension of the call auctions.  For the measurement 
of efficiency however, the sign of the autocorrelation is immaterial; inefficiency is present if the 
autocorrelation is significantly different from zero, whether positive or negative.  Given the change in 
sign from pre- to post-suspension, we checked the size of the autocorrelations by comparing the 
squared autocorrelation coefficients across firms.  This confirms an improvement in market efficiency, 
although the improvement was not significant according to this second test. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Tables 6 and 7 about here 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Auctions are thought to have particular value at the opening when it is necessary to aggregate 
overnight information to set prices early in the day.  Therefore, we also used higher frequency (intra-
day) data to investigate the price discovery process in the early part of the trading day before and after 
suspension.  If the opening auctions were valuable in price discovery, prices should move more 
quickly to their fundamental values and exhibit less autocorrelation than in the absence of the auction.  
We investigated this by calculating successive one minute returns on the Nifty in the first hour of 
trading, for 25 trading days before and 25 days after suspension12.  There was a significant decrease in 
the autocorrelation as between the pre- and post-suspension periods (table 6), suggesting that the 
auctions did not help in price discovery, even at the opening.  Thus, pricing efficiency generally 
increased after auction suspension, both during the trading day and within the first hour of the day.   
4.3  Liquidity 
Two measures were selected to assess the impact of suspension on market liquidity: the number of 
shares traded and the volume per unit of return. The number of shares traded increased significantly 
following suspension (table 7) suggesting that market liquidity improved between the two regimes.  
Volume per unit of return (the ratio of volume to the absolute return) is an estimate of how much 
trading is associated with a unit price change.  This measure assesses the resiliency aspect of liquidity: 
how much activity is required to generate a unit price change.  The more resilient is the market, the 
greater is the activity required to change the share price in either direction.  This statistic also indicates 
a significant increase in market liquidity following suspension of the auctions (table 7).  Of course, we 
would expect share volumes to trend upwards, even perhaps in the relatively short window within 
which our analysis is conducted.  To check this point we estimated a simple time trend regression for 
volume traded with shift and trend dummies at the suspension date.  This covered a longer-run period: 
January 1995 through December 2003; and it provides confirming evidence that there was a 
significant step increase in volume, though a small decrease in trend, following suspension of the 
auctions (table 7). 
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In summary, the evidence on VEL changes is not uniform, but a substantial majority of our tests 
suggests that there was an improvement in VEL following suspension of the auctions. 
5.  The Value of Opening and Closing Auctions to Shareholders 
5.1  Method 
We turn next to an event study to assess the value to shareholders of the suspension of the call 
auctions.  Event study methods are explained in detail by MacKinley (1997), so we content ourselves 
with a brief summary.  We used the market model adjusted for calendar time effects as our model of 
equilibrium returns:  
titmititi rr ,,,, ''                     (4) 
where: ri,t is the return of stock i on day t; rm,t is the market return; ttiti krr /' ,,  ; ttmtm krr /' ,,  ; k is 
the return interval in calendar days; αi and βi are the estimated coefficients; and εi,t is the error term.  
More elaborate equilibrium models do not usually yield significant gains in efficiency or unbiasedness 
in the measurement of the abnormal returns which are the key output of an event study (MacKinlay, 
1997; Cable and Holland, 1999).  All our stocks were traded every day in the sample period, and so no 
adjustments were necessary to allow for thin trading.  Daily abnormal returns for each firm in the 
event window (ARi,t) were calculated as: 
ttmiititi krrAR )]'ˆˆ('[ ,,,                   (5) 
and then cumulated over time to obtain the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs): 




15
2
,,
T
Tt
itit ARCAR                   (6) 
Finally, we averaged the CARs across the n sample firms to obtain: 



n
i
tit CARn
ACAR
1
,
1
                 (7) 
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For this study, the event date (t = T) is June 9th 1999, and the event window runs from T–2 to T+15, a 
total of 18 days.  A short pre-event window is suggested by the fact that the suspension was not trailed 
in advance.  The longer post-event window covers the possibility that the change might take time for 
markets to evaluate, in part because different market participants might interpret it differently.  A yet 
longer event window is not desirable here, as it would reduce the power of the tests (MacKinlay 
1997), and the CARs may be diluted by unrelated factors.  Normally, the estimation window precedes 
the event window, but this may create post-selection bias if the event is conditional on the 
characteristics of the securities.  (Amihud, et. al., 1997).  In this case, the event was not conditional on 
stock characteristics, and we therefore used a pre-event estimation window, from T–62 to T–3. 
We used as market index the BSE-500.  We took the view that it was desirable to use a broad-based 
index and the key NSE Nifty index comprised just 50 stocks during the sample period.  We believe 
that this choice of index is reasonable, given that major Indian stocks are quoted on both NSE and 
BSE, and both exchanges are subject to the same systematic risk13.  Daily data create a range of 
problems in event studies (Brown and Warner, 1985).  The main concern for this study is the typical 
non-normality of daily stock returns which creates problems for accurate inferences concerning the 
ARs, and suggests that we should not rely exclusively on standard t-tests.  We pursue this issue in 
section 5.2 next. 
5.2  Results 
OLS estimates of the market model and relevant diagnostics show that, in general, the model 
performed very well (table 8).  The betas are generally plausible; the F tests indicate that almost all the 
regressions have a good overall fit; and the diagnostics show that there is no serious evidence of 
misspecification or structural breaks.  This is important for our research, given that a frequent criticism 
of event studies is that inferences may be flawed because of time-varying betas.  The diagnostics 
indicate that betas were generally stable over our sample period.  The results of the predictive failure 
test are particularly strong, given that the 18 out-of-sample observations used for the test were in the 
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event window.  It suggests that we can be reasonably confident that the model did not change 
following the event.  The autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity tests do not reject the null hypothesis 
for most stocks. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Table 8 about here 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
The only diagnostic which seems problematic is the normality test where the null of normally 
distributed errors is rejected for 51% of stocks.  In fact, there are just a few abnormally high Jarque-
Bera statistics.  For the 6 highest, the fitted model mimicked actual market movements reasonably 
well, except for a few positive outliers, possibly due to company announcements.  Otherwise, the 
residuals were mostly close to zero, and almost uniformly distributed.  This suggests that the estimated 
coefficients will be close to their true values, and the main objective in dealing with this non-normality 
should be to enhance the power of the significance tests of the ARs, rather than to obtain better 
estimates of the regression coefficients.  For this, we follow MacKinnon (2002) who argued that 
bootstrap tests usually perform better in these circumstances than standard t-ratios.  The advantage of 
bootstrapping in the present context is that it relies only on the assumption of random sampling from 
the data at hand, and does not require any distributional assumptions.  Since we are interested in the 
significance of the ARs rather than their sign, we compare the error sum of squares in the estimation 
period to that in the event window for each stock.  For a valid comparison, we rescale the latter by the 
ratio of the numbers of observations in the estimation window to that in the event window.  Hence:  




3
62
2
,,...
T
Tt
tiestiERSS                   (8) 
 



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2
2
,, 18
60...
T
Tt
tieventiERSS                  (9) 
where: S.S.R.Ei,est and S.S.R.Ei,event are the Sums of Squared Rescaled Errors for stock i, in the 
estimation period and in the event window respectively.  The mean S.S.R.Eest was 0.0787 whilst that 
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for S.S.R.Eevent was 0.2429; a difference of 0.16419.  To test the significance of this difference, we 
combined the S.S.R.E.s for all stocks in the estimation period and the event period, into a single 
sample of 364 S.S.R.E.s.  Observations were then drawn randomly without replacement from this 
population, creating two equally-sized sub-samples.  The difference between the means of these sub-
samples was recorded, and the drawing repeated 5,000 times14.  The results are summarized in Figure 
2 where we see that 0.16419 actually lies outside the bootstrapped distribution, implying that we can 
reject the null hypothesis of equal means at the 99.98% level15 (at least) and conclude that the ARs are 
highly significant. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Figures 2, 3 about here 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
The cross-section average CARs for all stocks are shown in figure 316.  After an initial increase, the 
CARs decrease until about T+9; and then drift up again17.  The initial positive and later increasing 
CARs might correspond to the broad improvement in VEL, but the range of negative CARs is harder 
to reconcile with the calculated VEL changes.  Therefore, we consider next the possible linkages 
between the CARs and VEL changes. 
5.3. CARs and Volatility, Efficiency and Liquidity 
The relationships between the CARs and changes in VEL are investigated by performing two sets of 
cross-section regressions.  First, we check if the changes in VEL among stocks are related to their 
liquidity.  Second, we seek to explain the cross-sectional variation in the CARs by changes in VEL 
factors and liquidity levels.  We concentrate on liquidity because of the debate over the relationship 
between stock liquidity and the benefits of an auction.  We began by regressing the changes in 4 of our 
VEL measures on two dummy variables measuring the pre-event liquidity of the sample stocks: low 
and high liquidity.  Since our volatility measures gave different results as to the effect of the auction 
suspension, both SIDP and ORR were used as regressands.  For efficiency and liquidity, the measures 
showed the same qualitative effect of the auction suspension, so only one of each measure was used: 
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the change in Relative Return Dispersion and the change in the Volume-Return Ratio18.  We see in 
table 9 that these regressions have little explanatory power and neither of the liquidity dummies is 
significant, suggesting that the observed VEL changes are unrelated to stock liquidity. 
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__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Tables 9 and 10 about here 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
We turn next to the regressions explaining the CARs.  Although the CARs are statistically significant, 
there is an increasing and a decreasing segment.  We therefore regressed the increasing CARs from 
T+9 through T+15 on changes in VEL which showed an improvement, and on the pre-event liquidity 
dummies.  The decreasing CARs from t=T through T+8 were regressed on the overnight return 
reversal coefficient (π) which indicated a worsening of volatility, as well as on pre-event liquidity.  For 
the increasing CARs (Table 10, Panel A), Relative Return Dispersion and the Volume Return Ratio 
each have the expected sign although the former is not significant, whereas the Scaled Intra-Day Price 
Difference is significant but with an unexpected sign.  The liquidity dummies are insignificant, 
confirming that initial liquidity does not help explain the positive CARs.  These are contrary to the 
results of Kairys, Kruza, and Kumpins, (2000a) who found that in Riga increased liquidity largely 
accrued to the most liquid stocks. 
For the decreasing CARs (Panel B), Overnight Return Reversals are positive as expected and 
marginally significant.  The dummy for less liquid stocks is also significant and suggests that the least 
liquid stocks experienced higher CARs following abolition of the auctions.  However, as the dummy 
for the most liquid stocks is also positive but insignificant, we cannot conclude that there is a well-
defined relationship between liquidity and the CARs.  To check these results we split the whole 
sample into high, medium and less liquid stocks and recalculated the mean CARs (Figure 4).  This 
confirms that there is a difference between the CARs of the less liquid stocks (Sample A) and those of 
medium and high liquidity stocks, providing some support to the argument that call auctions may not 
be of benefit to less liquid stocks (Ellul, Shin and Tonks, 2004). 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Figure 4 about here 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
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6.  Further Discussion and Conclusions 
6.1  Some Possible Explanations 
Following auction suspension, we find that volatility, efficiency and liquidity on the NSE broadly 
improved, although one measure of volatility deteriorated.  An improvement in price discovery is also 
apparent in the first hour of the day’s trading.  These improvements are not accompanied by 
unambiguously positive CARs after the suspension, as shown in figure 3.  After an initial increase in 
the 2 days preceding suspension, the CARs are negative for most companies for most of the post-event 
window: first decreasing then increasing.  We consider five possible explanations for this apparent 
inconsistency. 
First, improvements in VEL may have been priced in before the suspension, even though it was 
announced on the day of implementation.  This may imply insider trading, or that the suspension was 
expected by the market.  However, changes which affect the structure of trading can be difficult to 
price in fully before the event because the volume and composition of trading after the event is not 
known for certain beforehand.  Similarly, it is unlikely that the event was anticipated given that it 
appears that auctions were suspended immediately after evidence of pricing problems materialised.   
Second, the cross-section regressions provide only limited support for the impact of VEL 
improvements on the CARs in that the increasing part of the CARs are explained to some extent by the 
positive changes in VEL factors, but not all with the expected sign.  One possibility is that the 
downward sloping part of the CARs was an initial overreaction which was subsequently reversed.  
This is consistent with the finding that the overreaction was confined to the more liquid stocks, as our 
evidence suggests that these gained less from suspension than did the less liquid stocks. 
Third, intra-day volatility decreased whilst overnight volatility increased.  A possible explanation for 
this is that the opening auctions did not reduce intra-day volatility, but the closing auctions did help 
reducing overnight volatility.  Existing literature does suggest some reasons why closing auctions may 
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be more effective than opening auctions.  Hillion and Suominen (2004) found that closing auctions 
may reduce the potential for market participants to manipulate closing prices.  Conversely, Caillaud 
and Mezzetti (2004) suggest that, in an opening auction, participants might be able to conceal 
information from other traders.  On the NSE, there was less activity at the opening call than the 
closing call, particularly for less liquid stocks.  Thus, we may hypothesise that whilst closing auctions 
helped to establish more efficient prices and therefore reduce overnight volatility, this was not 
happening at the opening auctions because of insufficient activity, particularly for less liquid stocks. 
Fourth, the results could be related directly to the different liquidity of the shares.  The CARs for the 
less liquid stocks were unambiguously positive, whereas the high and medium liquidity stocks 
exhibited initially small positive CARs then larger negative CARs (figure 4).  This is consistent with 
the view that higher liquidity stocks did benefit from the call auctions but low liquidity stocks did not.  
This too could be because the less liquid stocks traded much less actively in the call auctions and 
therefore had little to lose from suspension.  However, this does not explain why VEL improved on 
average for all stocks following suspension and that there is no clear cross-sectional relationship 
between liquidity and the VEL factors. 
Fifth and finally, it is possible that the call auctions had utility for specific types of investors, 
especially domestic or foreign institutions which may be key providers of market liquidity at certain 
times.  Available data does not permit a direct test of this hypothesis, but it seems unlikely that call 
auctions would have benefits for domestic institutions which would not be picked up in our general 
tests.  However, at the time of this analysis, foreign institutional investors (FIIs) were subject to firm-
specific ceilings on the percentage share they were permitted to hold in individual Indian companies.  
Once this ceiling was approached, FIIs were required to dispose of part of their holdings and a liquid 
market would be essential for this to function smoothly.  The call auctions may have facilitated this 
process and, soon after they were suspended, the NSE introduced (in December 1999) a new trading 
segment specifically to enable FIIs to dispose of security holdings in excess of the permitted maxima. 
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Taken together, these explanations suggest that the call auctions were not as effective as might have 
been expected, particularly at the opening, and particularly for less liquid stocks.  This is consistent 
with Schwartz (2000) who argued that it is essential that call auctions attract a critical mass of order 
flow, otherwise they may fail. 
6.2  Summary of Conclusions 
To our knowledge this is the first study to compare call auctions and continuous trading following a 
suspension, where no other changes in market protocols took place.  It is also concerned with an 
emerging market where low liquidity is a more pervasive problem than in the major industrial 
countries.  Our main conclusions from the study can be summarised as follows.  First, we confirm the 
prevailing wisdom that market microstructure changes do have measurable and significant effects on 
stock prices and on market performance measures such as volatility, efficiency and liquidity.  We 
found that VEL broadly improved following the auction suspension but the CARs, though significant, 
did not exhibit a uniformly positive or negative pattern.  As a corollary, it is evident that call auctions 
do not necessarily create an improvement in VEL factors as suggested inter alia by Madhavan (1992), 
for we find the reverse to be true. 
Second, we do not find a clear-cut market reaction to the suspension.  The CARs are significant but 
initially they decrease and then subsequently increase.  The cross-sectional relationships between the 
CARs and the underlying VEL factors are also imprecise.  Stocks which experienced the most 
improvements in efficiency and liquidity also experienced higher CARs, although the efficiency effect 
was not significant.  The improvement in intra-day volatility had a positive impact on the cross-section 
of CARs, while the deterioration in inter-day volatility had the expected negative effect. 
Third, we conjecture that a source of these conflicting findings may lie in the liquidity of the sample 
securities.  We find a difference in the response to the auction suspension as between less liquid and 
more liquid stocks.  Less liquid stocks traded less in the auctions than other securities, especially at the 
opening, and they experienced the most gains following suspension.  The results suggest that less 
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liquid stocks did not benefit from the auction system, and that the closing auction may have been more 
effective than the opening.  This could be because of a liquidity threshold which stocks have to pass to 
reap the information benefits of an auction (Schwartz, 2000, Ellul, Shin and Tonks, 2004).  Indeed, 
following Comerton-Forde and Rydge (2006), auction price manipulation is less costly in case of less 
active securities.  Given that suspension was related to software problems, it could also be that the 
structure of the auction contributed to the problems apparently experienced by less liquid stocks. 
One limitation of the analysis is that we have concentrated on the effectiveness of call auctions from 
the point of view of the market as a whole.  It is possible that auctions and other protocols may be of 
benefit to some market participants but not to others.  Disaggregating the costs and benefits of 
auctions is an interesting subject for future research.  
Overall though, our results have some important general implications.  First, we find further support 
for the argument that call auctions are not necessarily a superior method for opening and closing an 
otherwise continuous market.  The benefits or costs of call auctions appear to depend on the 
composition of the shares being traded.  This suggests that future research will need to delve more 
deeply into the nature of the trading process in different shares in the market.  Second, our results also 
show that it cannot be taken for granted that an opening or closing auction will improve share trading 
in a less liquid emerging market.  On the NSE, it appears to have been precisely the less liquid 
securities which gained least from the call auction system. 
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Table 1: Data Periods Used for the Comparison Analysis and Event Study 
 
Call auctions were suspended on June 9th 1999: t=T.  All other days are referred to in relation to June 
9th.  The comparison analyses include the tests of the differences in volatility, efficiency and liquidity. 
Open days are all days when trading took place on the exchange; closed days exclude weekends 
When working with prices, rather than returns, one further observation was available and so the pre-
event period used data from T-63 until T-1 and the post event period used data from T+1 till T+63. 
 
Panel A: Pre-Event and post-Event periods used for the comparison analyses 
 First day Last day Number of days in period 
 Event Time 
Date 
(1999) 
Event 
Time 
Date 
(1999) 
Open 
days 
Closed 
days 
Week-
days 
Total 
days 
Pre-event 
period T-62 
3rd 
March T-1 
8th 
June 62 8 70 98 
Post-event 
period T+1 
10th 
June T+62 
3rd 
Sept. 62 0 62 86 
Panel B: Estimation period and event window used for the event study 
 First day Last day Number of days in period 
 Event Time 
Date 
(1999) 
Event 
Time 
Date 
(1999) 
Open 
days 
Closed 
days 
Week-
days 
Total 
days 
Estimation 
period T-62 
3rd 
March T-3 
4th 
June 60 8 68 94 
Event 
window T-2 
7th 
June T+15 
30th 
June 18 0 18 24 
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Table 2: Opening and Closing Distributions around Auction Suspension 
 
These tests compare the Mean Standard Deviations (MSD) for the opening and closing returns on the 
Nifty index during the period May 26th to June 22nd 1999.  Auctions were suspended effective June 9th 
1999, so the data include ten trading days before suspension of the auctions, and a further ten days 
after suspension.  The opening distributions were defined as the first thirty Nifty observations, 
sampled at 30-second intervals covering approximately the first 15 minutes of trading.  The closing 
distributions were defined as the last thirty Nifty observations, sampled at 30-second intervals 
covering approximately the last 11 minutes of continuous trading, a 20-minute trading break, and the 
closing call auction.  The 20-minute break is treated as a 30-second interval for computational 
purposes.  The properties of these returns did not differ materially from those of the normal 30-second 
returns. 
Test 1 compares the MSDs before and after suspension. 
Test 2 compares the standard deviation on June 8th (the last auction date) with the MSD in the whole 
of the rest of the sample (19 days). 
Test 3 compares the MSD before suspension, excluding June 8th data, with the MSD after suspension, 
for the closing auction only. 
 
Test  Opening: MSD Closing: MSD 
1 Before suspension 0.0010 0.0005 
1 After  suspension 0.0015 0.0004 
1 t statistic [95% one-tail critical value] -1.4894  [1.7341] 1.7506  [1.7341] 
2 8th June 0.0015 0.0009 
2 Rest of sample 0.0013 0.0004 
2 t statistic [95% one-tail critical value] -0.2759  [1.7341] -1.7605  [1.7341] 
3 Before suspension except 8th June  0.0005 
3 After  suspension  0.0004 
3 t statistic [95% one-tail critical value]  1.4241  [1.7396] 
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Table 3: Closing Call Auction Summary Statistics 
 
The table reports the closing call auction summary statistics for 8th June 1999 as compared to the 
preceding five trading days.  The rows show the following information: Trading Day, Auction Starting 
Time, Auction Ending Time, the Duration of the Auction, the % change in the Nifty Index during the 
auction, the number of Nifty observations yielded by the auction software programme, and the average 
interval in between the Nifty observations during the call auction.    
 
Date (1999) 8 June  7 June  4 June 3 June  2 June  1 June  
Auction Starting Time 15:50:15 15:50:02 15:50:02 15:50:01 15:50:01 15:50:01 
Auction Ending Time 15:59:33 15:52:58 15:53:33 15:53:25 15:53:15 15:54:21 
Duration Of Auction 
(min-sec) 9- 18 2-56 3-31 3-24 3-14 4-20 
% Nifty Change 1.5% 0.3% -0.1% 0.0% -0.1% 0.2% 
# Observations 41 37 37 38 39 37 
Average Interval 14 sec. 5 sec. 6 sec. 5 sec. 5 sec. 7 sec. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Closing Call Auctions – Nifty Log Returns 
 
Figure 1 shows the price movements registered during the closing call auctions as given in the intra-
day data files provided by NSE.  The observations were not sampled at uniform time intervals 
 Closing Call Auctions - NSE Nifty Log Returns
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Table 4: Summary Statistics for Call Auctions 
 
These three days were randomly selected from those that were not more than one and a half months 
distant from the event, and so as to avoid duplication of days of the week. 
Sample A includes the 59 stocks with the lowest liquidity levels in terms of pre-event daily mean 
volume.  Sample C includes the 59 stocks with the highest pre-event daily mean volume.  The 
remaining 64 stocks were allocated to Sample B as “average liquidity” stocks. 
Variable definitions are as follows. 
Transactions = Total Number of Transactions (all stocks) 
Trades (%) = % of shares which traded in the auction 
ATS (IncZ) = Average no of Transactions per share (incl. zero observations) 
ATS (NoZ) =Average no of Transactions per share (excl. zero observations) 
AUT (IncZ) = Average no of Units Traded per share (incl. zero observations) 
AUT (NoZ) = Average no of Units Traded per share (excl. zero observations) 
 
 Monday  3 May 1999 
Thursday 
 27 May 1999 
Friday 
 4 June 1999 
 Open Close Open Close Open Close 
Transactions  1,274 2,995 1,446 13,361 3,392 5,642 
Sample A       
Trades (%)  7% 46% 13.6% 88% 18.6% 72.9% 
ATS (IncZ) 0.4 1.6 0.5 7.8 0.6 10.1 
ATS (NoZ) 5.3 3.4 3.5 8.8 3.3 13.8 
AUT (IncZ) 49 217 34 1,307 141 830 
AUT (NoZ) 725 473 254 1,482 755 1,140 
Sample B       
Trades (%)  45% 80% 41% 95% 39.7% 81.3% 
ATS (IncZ) 2.0 5.0 1.3 21.3 3.1 6.2 
ATS (NoZ) 4.5 6.3 3.2 22.7 8.0 7.6 
AUT (IncZ) 447 891 409 5,118 786 1,095 
AUT (NoZ) 986 1,118 1,005 5,459 2,012 1,348 
Sample C       
Trades (%)  80% 95% 95% 100% 86.4% 98.3% 
ATS (IncZ) 13.6 28.5 14.7 120.1 42.0 59.9 
ATS (NoZ) 17.1 30.0 15.4 120.1 48.5 60.9 
AUT (IncZ) 4,290 8,201 4,117 43,515 15,243 19,912 
AUT (NoZ) 5,385 8,640 4,338 43,515 17,634 20,255 
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Table 5: Volatility Comparisons 
 
Scaled Intra-Day Price Differences 
Di,t is defined for each firm as Di,t = (Phigh i,t – Plow i,t ) / Popen i,t, where: Phigh i,t, Plow i,t and Popen i,t are the 
high, low and opening prices for security i on day t respectively.  
σ(Di,t) are the standard deviations of each firm’s Di,t in the pre- and post-event period. 
Overnight Return Reversals 
π is the estimated coefficient in a regression of the daily return on the previous overnight return: 
titi
o
iiti rr ,,,   , where ri,t and roi,t are the daily and overnight returns, respectively.  These are: 
ri,t = (Pclose i,t – Popen i,t ) / Popen i,t, roi,t  = (Popen i,t – Pclose i,t-1 ) / Pclose i,t-1, and Pclose i,t-1 is the closing price 
for security i on day t – 1. 
Statistics 
The pre-event statistics were calculated using data from T-63 to T-1, and the post event statistics using 
data from T+1 to T+63.  The mean and standard deviations are the cross-section statistics for all firms.  
The t value is the t statistic for the null hypothesis of no difference between pre-and post event data 
calculated using the paired means test which provides a firm-by-firm comparison; they are not a direct 
comparison of the means reported in the table.  Critical values of t for a two-tail test (n = 182) are 
1.6533 (90%); 1.9732 (95%); 2.6033 (99%) 
Conditional volatility 
Estimates of an asymmetric volatility EGARCH model of the daily returns (rt) on the NIFTY given 
by: ttt rr   1 ; ),0(~ tt hN ;    )ln()ln( 1111111   ttttt huEuuh  ; 
),0(~ Nu t .  To ensure convergence, longer pre- and post-event periods were used than in other 
comparison tests: February 1st – June 8th and June 9th – November 16th respectively.  We used the Nifty 
index to avoid non-trading in individual stocks. 
 
Scaled Intra-Day Price Differences Overnight Return Reversals 
Di,t σ(Di,t) π 
 Pre-Event  Post-Event  Pre-Event  Post-Event  Pre-Event Post-Event 
Mean 0.0632 0.0564 0.0332 0.0332 -0.3439 -0.3970 
Standard 
Deviation 0.0211 0.0226 0.0165 0.0491 0.1726 0.2288 
t value 7.6443*** 0.0027 2.9097*** 
Conditional Volatility 
 Pre-Event Post-Event 
 coefficient t statistic coefficient t statistic 
ρ – 0.04843 (0.1121) 0.0507 (0.0921) 
α 0.1013 (0.2436) – 0.0434 (0.0964) 
γ 0.2791 (0.2804) 0.0646 (0.1092) 
β 0.1758 (0.4948) – 0.9016 *** (0.1463) 
2R  0.0118 0.0018 
*** significant at 99% level; ** significant at 95% level; * significant at 90% level. 
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Table 6: Efficiency Comparisons 
 
Relative Return Dispersion 



n
i
itt n
RRD
1
21  ; where εit are the residuals from the market model for security i at time t, and n is 
the number of sampled securities. 
Relative Return Dispersion 
ρ is the first-order autocorrelation coefficient calculated for each firm 
ρ2 is the square of ρ. 
Statistics 
The pre-event statistics were calculated using data from T-63 to T-1, and the post event statistics using 
data from T+1 to T+63.  The mean and standard deviations are the cross-section statistics for all firms.  
The t value is the t statistic for the null hypothesis of no difference between pre-and post event data 
calculated using the paired means test which provides a firm-by-firm comparison; they are not a direct 
comparison of the means reported in the table.  Critical values of t for a two-tail test (n = 182) are 
1.6533 (90%); 1.9732 (95%); 2.6033 (99%) 
Serial Correlation at the opening 
φ is the first-order autocorrelation coefficient for returns on the NIFTY sampled at one minute 
intervals in the first hour of the day for each of 25 days before and after suspension of the auctions: 
respectively, 4th May 1999 – 8th June 1999 and 9th June 1999 – 14th July 1999.  May 21st and June 
28th were excluded because of trading suspensions during the first hour of the day.  We used the 
NIFTY index to avoid non-trading in individual stocks. 
Statistics 
Time mean and standard deviation are the time mean and standard deviation of these ρ.  The t value is 
the t statistic for the null hypothesis of no difference between pre-and post event mean values of ρ, 
calculated using the pooled variance. 
 
Relative Return Dispersion (RRDt) 
 Pre-Event Post-Event 
Mean  0.1272 0.1017 
Standard Deviation 0.1196 0.1127 
t value 2.9308*** 
Serial Correlation of Returns 
 ρ ρ2 
 Pre-Event Post-Event Pre-Event Post-Event 
Mean  -0.0169 0.0791 0.0304 0.0292 
Standard Deviation 0.1739 0.1519 0.0409 0.0352 
t value 6.3912*** 0.2748 
Serial Correlation at the opening (φ) 
 Pre-Event Post-Event 
Time mean  0.3690 0.2261 
Standard Deviation 0.1109 0.1910 
t value 3.2352*** 
99% critical value (2.6822)  
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  *** significant at 99% level; ** significant at 95% level; * significant at 90% level. 
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Table 7: Liquidity Comparisons 
 
Number of shares traded is calculated for each firm in the pre-event and post-event periods. 
Volume/return ratio is the ratio of the number of shares traded in each firm to the daily absolute 
return.  The daily returns include zeroes whereas the volumes do not.  Therefore, we first computed 
daily return/volume ratios for each firm, then calculated the firm means, and finally the reciprocals of 
the means.  This gave (mean) volume/return ratios for each firm in the pre- and post-event periods.  
The cross-section means and standard deviations of these ratios are reported in table 5; and the cross-
section t-tests were performed on the volume/return ratios. 
Statistics 
The pre-event statistics were calculated using data from T-63 to T-1, and the post event statistics using 
data from T+1 to T+63.  The mean and standard deviations are the cross-section statistics for all firms.  
The t value is the t statistic for the null hypothesis of no difference between pre-and post event data 
calculated using the paired means test which provides a firm-by-firm comparison; they are not a direct 
comparison of the means reported in the table.  Critical values of t for a two-tail test (n = 182) are 
1.6533 (90%); 1.9732 (95%); 2.6033 (99%) 
Volume time trend regresions 
Regression of Ln(Volume) on a constant, time trend and 2 dummies.  D = 0 through June 8th 1999, and 
1 thereafter.  D×trend is the product of the D and the time trend.  The volume data are the daily total 
NSE share volumes from January 1995 through December 2003.  R2 = 0.9034. 
 
 Number of Shares Traded Volume/Return Ratio 
 Pre-Event Post-Event Pre-Event Post-Event 
Mean  322,391 367,123 108,730 141,148 
Standard Deviation 986,908 942,824 284,978 338,722 
t value -1.9422* -4.4228*** 
Volume: time trend regression 
 constant trend D D×trend 
Coefficient 9.4426 0.0033 2.0490 –0.0021 
t value 348.8 78.5 27.9 36.6 
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Table 8: Market Model Estimates 
 
Summary statistics 
Each column gives respectively the cross-section mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and 
maximum of the firm-specific estimates of the parameters of the market model. 
Diagnostics 
Each column gives respectively, the cross-section mean, minimum and maximum of the corresponding 
diagnostics from the firm-specific estimates of the market model.  “95% CV” is the 95% critical value 
of each test; “No. of rejects” shows the number of shares where the null hypothesis was rejected at the 
95% level indicating a possible misspecification; “% rejects” shows the percentage of shares for which 
the null hypothesis was rejected at the 95% level  
F-statistic: F test for zero slopes for the regression as a whole. 
Autocorrelation: LM test for first-order autocorrelation (Breusch and Pagan, 1980). 
Reset: Ramsey’s test for functional form using squares of the fitted values (Ramsey, 1969). 
Normality: Jarque and Bera’s (1980) test for normality. 
Heteroscedasticity: LM test for heteroscedasticity (Breusch and Pagan, 1980). 
Predictive Failure: Chow’s second test for structural breaks (Chow, 1960).  This was applied to the 
18 observations within the event window. 
Chow: Standard Chow test for structural break at the mid-point of the estimation window. 
 
Summary Statistics 
 Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Min. Max. 
Intercept: αi 0.0008 0.0009 0.0041 -0.0118 0.0168 
t-value: tα 0.1803 0.1958 0.8917 -2.4429 3.3704 
Beta: βi 1.203 1.2231 0.4433 0.1952 2.6905 
t-value: tβ 4.6648 4.7075 1.7018 0.8237 9.0861 
R2 0.2724 0.2764 0.1324 0.0116 0.5874 
Diagnostics 
 Μean Min. Max. 95% CV No. of 
rejects 
% 
rejects 
F-statistic F (1,58) 24.6409 0.6785 82.5571 4.0000 169 93% 
Autocorrelation: χ2(1) 2.2013 0.0004 23.3566 3.8410 36 20% 
Reset:  F (1,57) 1.4317 0.0000 21.2354 4.0000 21 12% 
Normality:  χ2(2) 76.9884 0.0118 6645.50 5.9910 93 51% 
Heteroscedasticity:  χ2(1) 1.2330 0.0004 36.3735 3.8410 13 7% 
Predictive Failure:  F (18,58) 1.0631 0.1022 10.6618 1.8100 23 13% 
Chow:  F(2,74) 0.9962 0.0040 6.7545 3.1200 13 7% 
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Figure 2: Mean Differences for S.S.M.E. 
Random Sub-Samples in the Bootstrap Procedure. 
 
The histogram shows a summary of the mean differences obtained when the S.S.R.E.s were randomly 
re-sampled 5000 times from the estimation period and the event window combined.   Each bin covers 
all values within 0.005 of its centre.   
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Frequency 
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Figure 3:  Average CARs during the Event Window 
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Table 9: Stock liquidity and Changes in Volatility, Efficiency and Liquidity 
 
Δ SIDPD is the % change in the Scaled Intra-Day Price Difference between the pre-event and post-
event period (table 2). 
ORR is the coefficient (π) in the regressions of the daily return on the previous overnight return. 
Δ RRD is the % change in the relative return dispersion between the pre-event and post-event period. 
Δ VRR is the % change in the Volume-Return ratio between the pre-event and post-event period. 
LD1 =1 for less liquid stocks: pre-event mean daily volume ≤ 40,000 shares; zero otherwise; 
LD2 = 1 for very liquid stocks: pre-event mean daily volume ≥ 140,000 shares; zero otherwise. 
These thresholds were set to divide the whole sample into three, approximately equal categories. 
t statistics are shown in parentheses.  Critical values of t for a two-tail test (n = 182) are 1.6533 
(90%); 1.9732 (95%); 2.6033 (99%) 
 
Liquidity Regressions Dependent 
Variable C LD1 LD2 R2 
-0.1163 0.0421 -0.022 0.026 Δ SIDPD 
 (t stat) (5.73)*** (1.44) (0.75)  
-0.0427 0.0132 -0.0452 0.0102 ORR 
 (t stat) (1.39) (0.30) (1.02)  
-0.1136 0.1559 -0.1067 0.0138 Δ RRD 
 (t stat) (1.00) (0.95) (0.65)  
0.4854 0.2496 -0.295 0.0415 Δ VRR 
 (t stat) (3.65)*** (1.30) (1.54)  
  *** significant at 99% level; ** significant at 95% level; * significant at 90% level. 
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Table 10: Determinants of CARs 
 
Panel A 
Regressors are: ΔSIDPD = % change in Scaled Intra-Day Price Difference; ΔRRD = % change in 
Relative Return Dispersion; ΔVRR = % change in Volume-Return Ratio; LD1, LD2 are the Liquidity 
dummy variables as in table 7 
Panel B 
Regressors are: ORR is the coefficient (π) in the regressions of the daily return on the previous 
overnight return; LD1, LD2 are the Liquidity dummy variables as in table 7 
t statistics are shown in parentheses.  Critical values of t for a two-tail test (n = 182) are 1.6533 
(90%); 1.9732 (95%); 2.6033 (99%) 
 
Panel A. Dependent variable:  Mean CARs T+9 through T+15 
C ΔSIDPD ΔRRD ΔVRR LD1 LD2 R2 
0.048 0.225 -0.001 0.024   0.174 
(4.00)*** (3.81)*** (0.10) (3.00)***    
0.046 0.216 -0.002 0.021 0.025 -0.018 0.194 
(2.88)*** (3.66)*** (0.20) (2.63)*** (1.25) (0.90)  
Panel B. Dependent variable:  Mean CARs T+0 through T+8 
C ORR   LD1 LD2 R2 
-0.039 0.070     0.018 
(3.90)*** (1.84)*      
-0.068 0.063   0.074 0.015 0.081 
(4.53)*** (1.70)*   (3.36)*** (0.68)  
   *** significant at 99% level; ** significant at 95% level; * significant at 90% level. 
 
 
Figure 4: Different CAR patterns for stocks with differing liquidity levels 
 
Sample A includes 59 sampled stocks with the lowest liquidity levels in terms of pre-event daily mean 
volume.  Sample C includes the 59 stocks with the highest pre-event daily mean volume.  The 
remaining 64 stocks were allocated to Sample B as “average liquidity” stocks. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Table A1: Monthly Seasonality of Volatility 
 
Table A1 shows results for Monthly Seasonality of Volatility Regressions using Nifty Index daily observations 
from January 1st 1999 through December 31st 2003.  Volatility is measured by the Modulus of Log Returns in 
regression 1; and by the Intra-Day Scaled Difference in regression 2.  The first explanatory variable is a dummy 
taking a value of 1 during March & April and zero otherwise, and the second explanatory variable is a dummy 
taking a value of 1 during August and zero otherwise. 
These results are taken from: Camilleri, S.J. and Green C.J., 2005.  The Seasonality of Stock Price Volatility and 
Its Relevance to Excessive Price Movements:  Empirical Evidence from the National Stock Exchange, India, 
Unpublished Working Paper, Loughborough University. 
 
Regression 1 Regression 2 Volatility Proxy 
Modulus of Log Returns Intra-Day Scaled Difference  
 Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. 
Intercept 0.0113 0.0003*** 0.0207 0.0004*** 
Dummy Variables:     
March-April 0.0043 0.0008*** 0.0080 0.0010*** 
August -0.0026 0.0011*** -0.0039 0.0013*** 
R2 R-bar2 F-Stat. R2 R-bar2 F-Stat. Summary Statistics 0.0279 0.0264 18.011 0.0667 0.0652 44.800 
Notes:  *** Significant at the 99% level.  
 
 
 Table A2: Seasonally Adjusted Volatility Comparisons 
 
These are the same comparisons as in text table 5 but based on adjusted SIDP and ORR data. 
The SIDP was adjusted for the seasonal pattern shown in table A1.  SIDP is 0.008 higher in March and April 
and 0.0039 lower in August.  This implies that about two-thirds of our pre-event SIDP observations for each 
stock could be scaled down by 0.008.  As an approximation, the SIDP for each stock during the pre-event period 
was adjusted down by 0.0053 (=0.008×2/3).  Similarly, about one-third of our post-event SIDP observations for 
each stock could be scaled up by 0.0039.  This was approximated by an upward adjustment of the SIDP for each 
stock by 0.0013  (=0.0039×1/3).   
The ORR was similarly adjusted for the seasonal pattern shown in table A1.  The Return Modulus is 0.0043 
higher in March and April, and therefore the ORR modulus for each stock in the pre-event period was adjusted 
down by 0.00287 (=0.0043×2/3).  The Return Modulus is 0.0026 lower in August, and therefore the ORR 
modulus for each stock in the pre-event period was adjusted upwards by 0.00087 (=0.0026×1/3). 
Critical values of t for a two-tail test (n = 182) are 1.6533 (90%); 1.9732 (95%); 2.6033 (99%) 
 
Scaled Intra-Day Price Differences Overnight Return Reversals 
Di,t π 
 Pre-Event  Post-Event  Pre-Event Post-Event 
Mean 0.0628 0.0565 -0.3429 -0.3973 
Standard 
Deviation 0.0210 0.0227 0.1721 0.2290 
t value 7.1823*** 2.9836*** 
*** significant at 99% level. 
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Footnotes 
                                                 
1  For instance Roth and Ockenfels (2002) presented evidence that subtle differences in internet auctions used 
for trading non-financial assets can cause pronounced differences in bidding behaviour.   
2 The NSE circular announcing this change was issued on the same day. 
3 Following suspension of the call auction on NSE, the time devoted to continuous trading was unchanged.   
4 Ellul, Shin and Tonks (2004) identify a clear-cut comparison between the opening and closing calls on the 
London Stock Exchange and the parallel off-exchange dealer market.  However, results for London may not 
be applicable in an emerging market. 
5  Similar results are reported by Dia and Pouget (2004a) for the West-African Bourse. 
6 Our sample period is characterized by occasional minor changes in trading hours 
7 We thank the NSE for providing us with trial copies of these data. 
8 The rationale for using the BSE index for certain analyses is explained in section 5.1 below. 
9 We thank Susan Thomas for helpful correspondence on the suspension.  Perhaps not surprisingly, the NSE 
did not issue a public statement about the reasons for the suspension and, despite several efforts, we were 
unable to obtain from them any further background information.  However, as we discuss next, our check of 
the pre-suspension data suggests that any software problems that did exist did not have a measurable effect 
on the pricing process except in the very last auction before suspension. 
10 NSE regulations permit release of earnings news at any time in the trading day, and so there is no overnight 
effect arising from the systematic release of earnings news out of trading hours. 
11 We used the Nifty index to avoid non-trading in individual stocks. 
12 We began with the last 26 trading days of the auction regime (4th May 1999 – 8th June 1999) and the first 
26 trading days of the post-auction regime (9th June 1999 – 14th July 1999).  May 21st and June 28th 1999 
were dropped from this sample because of trading suspensions during the first hour of the day, leaving 25 
trading days in each regime.  We used the Nifty index to avoid non-trading in individual stocks. 
13 Five trading days were omitted from the sample because the BSE was closed on these days. 
14 The bootstrap routine was obtained from http://www.resample.com/content/about.shtml (accessed 1st March 
2004). 
15 That is: the probability of obtaining the reported mean difference by coincidence is less than 1 in 5000. 
16  It is possible that the concentration of annual company reports in the pre-event window may bias the CARs.  
To check this we re-estimated the cross-sectional CARs omitting securities which went ex-dividend in the 
pre-event period or the event window.  The pattern of CARs for the remaining 116 securities (available from 
the authors on request) was similar to that for the whole sample. 
17 As a check on the cross-section average, the sample was randomly split into 5 sub-samples (three containing 
36 stocks, two containing 37) and the average CARs recalculated for each sub-sample.  The plots of the five 
sub-samples (available from the authors on request) were similar to the overall pattern of figure 3. 
18 These measures were selected on the basis of a higher significance level in the VEL comparisons. 
